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ARGUMENT 
I. Plaintiffs have failed to show that "minor child" is ambiguous-
Plaintiffs assert that the term "minor child" is ambiguous, without any 
analysis of the words. Plaintiffs rely only on the absence of a definition of the 
term in the wrongful death statute and the fact that the Utah Legislature did not 
explicitly exclude unborn children from the statute's coverage. See Plaintiffs' 
Opening Brief at 10-11. A statute's terms are not rendered ambiguous merely 
because they are not defined, however. If that were true, the vast majority of 
statutory terms would be ambiguous. 
Instead, as discussed in the United States' Opening Brief, the Court looks to 
the "plain meaning" of statutory terms to determine whether they are ambiguous. 
See U.S. Op. Br. at 7. Terms are considered ambiguous only if they "may be 
understood to have two or more plausible meanings." R & R Indus. Park, L.L.C. 
v. Utah Prop, and Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n. 2008 UT 80, ^ 23, 199 P.3d 917 (citation 
and internal quotations omitted). Words are not ambiguous "simply because one 
party seeks to endow them with a different interpretation according to his or her 
own interests." See Alf v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co.. 850 P.2d 1272, 1274-75 
(Utah 1993) (footnote omitted) (interpreting terms of an insurance policy). If a 
statutory term is not ambiguous, the Court will not look beyond the plain language 
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to the legislative history or policy considerations. Vigos v. Mountainland 
Builders. Inc.. 2000 UT 2, ^ 13, 993 P.2d 207. 
The analytical framework for interpreting statutory language is exemplified 
by State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Clyde. 920 P.2d 1183 (Utah 1996). In Clyde, 
the plaintiffs' minor daughter was killed in a car accident. The plaintiffs' daughter 
was pregnant and unmarried at the time of her death, and the fetus did not survive 
the accident. After the plaintiffs settled with the other driver's insurer, they filed a 
claim with State Farm, their own insurer, under the underinsured-motorist 
provision of their policy. The plaintiffs sought recovery not only for the death of 
their daughter but also for the death of her unborn child. 
State Farm filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the plaintiffs were 
not entitled to maintain an action for the wrongful death of their unborn 
grandchild. State Farm moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs 
were neither "parents" nor "guardians" of their daughter's unborn child, as 
required by the wrongful death statute. Id at 1185 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
11-6). The trial court granted State Farm's motion. 
The plaintiffs appealed and argued that "because they provided [their 
daughter's], and therefore her unborn child's, sole means of support, they stood in 
loco parentis to the unborn child and should be treated as de facto parents or 
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guardians under section 78-11-6." IdL This Court first noted that '"the right of 
action to recover damages for death is not a common-law right, but is one created 
by statute, and hence the law creating the right can also prescribe the conditions of 
its enforcement.'" IdL (citing Parmley v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co., 64 Utah 125, 
228 P. 557, 560 (1924)). The Court then looked to the plain language of the 
wrongful death statute in order to give effect to the legislature's intent.1 Id at 
1186. The Court determined that the ordinary meaning of "parent" does not 
include a grandparent or other person standing in loco parentis. The Court further 
determined that the well-established legal meaning of "guardian" includes only 
one who has been validly appointed as a guardian. Based on the plain meaning of 
these terms, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs were neither parents nor 
guardians of their unborn grandchild and thus were not entitled to maintain a claim 
under Utah's wrongful death statute. Id. at 1186-87. 
Since the plaintiffs in Clyde lacked standing to pursue their claim, the Court 
declined to address "the more general question of whether the death of a fetus can 
ever provide the basis for maintaining an action under section 78-11-6." Id, at 
1
 The wrongful death statute did not define "parent" or "guardian," nor did it 
explicitly exclude grandparents. 
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1187 n.4 (citing Webb v. Snow, 132 P.2d 114, 119 (Utah 1942) and Nelson v. 
Peterson, 542 P.2d 1075, 1079 (Utah 1975) (Maughan, J., dissenting)). 
That issue is now squarely before the Court, and an analysis of the plain language 
of the wrongful death statute is determinative of the issue. 
As discussed in the United States' Opening Brief, "child" has more than one 
plausible meaning. See U.S. Op. Br. at 7-8. But the Legislature created a cause of 
action only for the death of a "minor" child, and the Legislature is presumed to 
have used the term "minor" advisedly.2 Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2007 
UT 42,146, 164 P.3d 384. A "minor" child is one who has achieved an age 
between birth and 18 years. See U.S. Op. Br. at 8-9. By definition, then, an 
unborn child cannot be a "minor child." Since this term is not ambiguous, the 
Court need not look beyond the statutory language. The plain meaning of the 
wrongful death statute does not provide a cause of action for the wrongful death of 
an unborn child. 
2
 Plaintiffs mistakenly assert that "minor child" was added to the wrongful 
death statute by a 2003 amendment. See Pis.' Op. Br. at 14. In fact, the statute 
has used the term "minor child" since at least 1898. See U.S. Op. Br. at 6. 
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II. Even if "minor child" were ambiguous, the Utah Legislature's explicit 
reference to "unborn" children or individuals in other statutes shows 
that the Legislature did not intend that the wrongful death statute 
provide a claim arising from the death of an unborn child. 
Although this Court determined in Clyde that the plain language of the 
wrongful death statute was determinative, the Court also examined other evidence 
of the Utah Legislature's intent. The Court noted that the Legislature had 
expressly included persons standing "in loco parentis" in several other statutes but 
did not do so in the wrongful death statute. 920 P.2d at 1187. The Court 
explained that this supported its interpretation of the statute: "[T]he legislature 
knew how to use the term 'in loco parentis' but chose not to do so in section 78-
11-6 and therefore did not intend to allow persons standing in loco parentis to 
maintain an action for the wrongful death of a minor." kL (footnote omitted). 
As discussed in the United States' Opening Brief, the same reasoning 
applies in the present case. The Utah Legislature has enacted several statutes in 
which it expressly included "unborn" children or individuals in addition to 
"children" or "minor" children. See U.S. Op. Br. at 10-11. Thus, to paraphrase 
this Court's reasoning in Clyde, the Legislature knows how to include the unborn 
in statutory language but chose not to do so in the wrongful death statute, and thus 
did not intend to provide a cause of action for the death of an unborn child. 
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Plaintiffs argue that because the Legislature included "unborn child" in the 
criminal homicide statute, "it would logically and morally follow" that the 
Legislature also intended to create civil liability for the death of an unborn child. 
See Pis.' Op. Br. at 13-14. To the contrary, the Legislature's choice of language 
leads to the opposite conclusion. The criminal homicide statute shows that the 
Legislature uses the word "unborn" when it intends to include unborn children in a 
statute's coverage. Since the Legislature has not done so in the wrongful death 
statute, its intent could not be clearer. 
And to the extent Plaintiffs argue that the inclusion of the unborn in the 
wrongful death statute is "morally" required, that is an argument for a legislative 
amendment, not judicial action. As this Court explained in Clyde. "While we 
sympathize with the [plaintiffs] for their loss, we cannot ignore the plain language 
of section 78-11-6. 'The fact that the result in some circumstances may be to 
unreasonably restrict the class of persons who can bring a wrongful death action is 
an argument for amendment of the statute, not for our ignoring its words.'" 920 
P.2d at 1187 (citation omitted). 
The Legislature's retention of the term "minor child" in the wrongful death 
statute is particularly noteworthy in light of this Court's decisions rejecting claims 
for the wrongful deaths of unborn children. See U.S. Op. Br. at 11-14 (discussing 
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Webb v. Snow. 132 P.2d 114 (Utah 1942) and Nelson v. Peterson. 542 P.2d 1075 
(Utah 1975)). Plaintiffs devote a substantial part of their opening brief to a 
discussion of whether Webb and Nelson represent binding precedent on this Court 
under the principle of stare decisis. See Pis.' Op. Br. at 14-18. This misses the 
point of the United States' citation of these cases. As discussed in the United 
States' Opening Brief, the fact that this Court issued two decisions rejecting 
claims for the wrongful deaths of unborn children provides additional evidence of 
the Legislature's intent. See U.S. Op. Br. at 11-14. Since legislative bodies are 
presumed to be aware of relevant judicial decisions, the Utah Legislature is 
presumed to have been aware of the Webb and Nelson decisions when it amended 
the wrongful death statute several times thereafter. If the Legislature had intended 
that the statute cover claims based on the wrongful deaths of unborn children, it 
had numerous opportunities to make its intent clear after this Court had rejected 
such claims. The fact that the Legislature did not do so further demonstrates its 
intent to limit claims to those arising from the deaths of children between birth and 
18 years of age. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and in the United States' Opening Brief, the 
United States requests that this Court answer the issue certified by the United 
States District Court as set forth in the United States' Opening Brief at 14. 
DATED this 8th day of February, 2010. 
CARLIE CHRISTENSEN 
Acting United States Attorney 
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AMY J. OLIVER 
Assistant United States Attorneys 
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